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The U.S.-Japan Alliance
Executive Summary
This paper is focused on the U.S.-Japan alliance as reflected in the evolution of the U. commitment to the security of Japan, and a common strategic vision based on shared values. The statement also tasked the two governments to review the existing 1997 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Over the course of three-plus decades, the guidelines have served as the framework for U.S.-Japan security cooperation.
The guidelines date back to the Cold War. They were first agreed to in 1978 and, operationally, focused on the defense of Japan. Defense planning under the guidelines concentrated on a potential Soviet invasion of Japan's northernmost island, Hokkaido, while assigning regional contingencies to joint studies.
The guidelines, however, failed to address the emerging challenges to international security that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Cold War construct of international relations. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States fashioned a United Nations-based international coalition to liberate Kuwait. Constrained by political understandings regarding the exercise of collective self-defense, Japan contributed $13 billion and was internationally criticized for "checkbook" diplomacy. The Persian Gulf War revealed a fundamental disconnect between the United States and Japan in responding to the security challenges of the post-Cold War world.
At the same time, events on the Korean Peninsula-the nuclear crisis resulting from North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and provocative rhetoric threatening to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire"-revealed serious shortcomings in the guidelines framework for security cooperation. To deal with a potential conflict, the United States moved to augment forces on the peninsula using Japanese ports and airfields, only to meet with Japanese legal restrictions. With still fresh memories of the Persian Gulf War, officials in Washington and Tokyo recognized that a failure by Japan adequately to support the United States in a Korea-like contingency in the Asia-Pacific region could put the alliance at risk. This recognition ultimately led to the 1997 revision of the guidelines.
The 1997 guidelines expanded the focus of the alliance from the defense of Japan to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, introducing a new area of emphasis, cooperation in areas surrounding Japan that could significantly affect its security, and recognition that developments in these areas could result in an armed attack on Japan. The revised guidelines opened the door to planning for a Korean Peninsula contingency.
Four years later, the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States transformed the international security environment and reoriented the Bush administration from its initial focus on great power relations to the Middle East, involving the U.S. in a decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. During this period, Japan supported counterterrorist maritime operations during Operation Enduring Freedom and postconflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
In Northeast Asia, the collapse of the Agreed Framework and the development of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs combined to pose a direct threat to the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Japan's relations with China grew increasingly complex. The rapid modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), expanding activities of the PLA Navy in waters off Japan, increasing challenges to Japan's administrative control over the Senkaku Islands, and a heightened concern with gray zone situations all resulted in an operational transformation of the Japan's Self-Defense Forces. For over a decade, the Japanese government moved to transition the Self-Defense Forces from a static Cold War force posture to a dynamic force marked by mobility and flexibility and to shift the geographic focus of its activities from Japan's north to its southwestern islands. At the same time, new threats arose in the domains of cyber and space.
To meet the emerging 21 st -century international stability and security, the United States and Japan agreed to review the 1997 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Four key policy decisions related to the geographic extent of the alliance-situations in areas surrounding Japan, extended deterrence, gray zones, and Japan's right to collective self-defense-will shape the review of the guidelines. This report makes recommendations in each area.
Introduction
This report is the product of a study group convened under the auspices of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University to review the United States-Japan alliance and to consider future steps to strengthen its functioning.
Special thanks are due to Ambassador (Ret.) Rust Deming, Lieutenant General Wallace Gregson, USMC (Ret.), Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), Paul Giarra, Robin Sakoda, Michael Schiffer, James Schoff, and Nicholas Szeczenyi, among others, for their contributions.
The report begins with consideration of the October 3, 2013, Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee; sets out the broad, historic interests that have guided U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region; reviews the evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance, beginning with the initial 1978 guidelines for defense cooperation through the 1997 review of the guidelines; and concludes with a look ahead at the challenges and issues that will shape the pending 2014 review of the defense guidelines.
The Joint Statement
The Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, "Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities, " was issued at the conclusion of the 2+2 meeting of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan's Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defense in Tokyo on October 3, 2013. Significantly, the October 3 meeting was the first 2+2 meeting ever held in Tokyo, placing the alliance at the core of the ongoing U.S. strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
The Joint Statement reaffirmed the "indispensable role" played by the alliance "in the maintenance of international peace and security"; the U.S. commitment "to the security of Japan"; and a shared strategic vision, based on "values of democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets and respect for human rights. "
In this context, the alliance partners agreed to take "several steps to upgrade significantly the capability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. " Among the steps were "revising the 1997 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, expanding security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and approving new measures that support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. " With Japan committing to an expanded role within the alliance, the United States welcomed its decision to review the existing legal interpretation of the Japanese constitution with regard to the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, as well as its commitment to increase defense spending to enable Japan to defend its "sovereign territory" and contribute to capacitybuilding in Southeast Asia. 1 Among the security challenges facing the alliance, the Joint Statement identified "North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . and man-made and natural disasters. " Reiterating shared strategic objectives toward China, the Joint Statement encouraged Beijing to play "a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid[ly] expanding military investments. "
In terms of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, the Joint Statement emphasized the importance of strengthening the deterrence and defense posture of the alliance through joint planning, training, and operations. Among areas highlighted for enhanced bilateral cooperation are missile defense; cyberspace; space (the agreement of Japan's Aerospace Exploration Agency to share information with the United States to strengthen domain awareness in space as well as space-based maritime awareness); joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; information security; defense equipment and technology/equipment acquisition collaboration; bilateral planning; and joint training and exercises. alliances-with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand-to protect these countries from aggression as well as to advance its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. This system of bilateral defensive alliances remains today as the bulwark of regional security.
For over six decades, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. forward-deployed presence in Japan have served as the foundation for stability, prosperity, and security in the AsiaPacific region and beyond. For the United States, the ability to project power and meet security commitments to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and allies across the region and to assure partners of its continuing presence in the region remains directly dependent on the alliance structure. For the United States, the alliance with Japan is the foundation of its regional and global security strategies. The ability to project power nearly halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies' success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War-the USS Independence was then home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan-and the deployment of the
Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf to support Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi
Freedom again underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Today, the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region are engaged in updating and strengthening the alliances to address the security challenges of the 21 st century. It is in this context that the United States and Japan in 2014 are now engaged in reviewing the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The present review takes place against the background of previous efforts to enhance alliance-based security cooperation-namely, the defense guidelines of 1978 and 1997.
Evolution of the Alliance: The 1978 Guidelines
In 1975, following a meeting in Tokyo between Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and the Director General of Japan's Self-Defense Agency, Michita Sakata, the United States and Japan agreed to hold annual defense-related meetings and to establish, under the Security Consultative Committee, the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, issued on November 27, 1978, represented the outcome of the subcommittee's deliberations. The guidelines focused on three major areas: "Posture for Deterring Aggression; Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan; and Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan. " The subcommittee agreed to set aside matters relating to sensitive Japanese domestic issues, Japan's constitution, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and prior consultation regarding changes in the deployment of U.S.
forces and equipment in Japan.
The guidelines centered the deterrence posture of the alliance on the combined strength of Japan's own defense capabilities, U.S. forward-deployed forces in Japan, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent. With regard to armed attacks, Japan assumed responsibility to "repel limited, smallscale aggression" with large-scale attacks addressed in cooperation with the United States. Japan would take the lead in "defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, " with U.S. forces playing a supporting role. Intelligence cooperation and mutual logistical support aimed to enhance operational effectiveness. As for developments in the region affecting the security of Japan, the two sides agreed to conduct studies on the nature and dimension of assistance that Japan, in accordance with its "relevant laws and regulations, " could provide to the United States. 3 Operationally, the guidelines focused on the defense of Japan. In the existing Cold War context, an attack by the Soviet Union on Japan's northern island of Hokkaido served as the focus of defense planning. Responses to regional security issues were set aside for joint study and consultation. Conceptually, however, the guidelines opened the alliance to enhanced cooperation, to joint planning and training, and, down the road, to the prospect of interoperability.
Defense exercises, however, remained focused on a Soviet invasion.
In their joint study, In its efforts to build the allied coalition, the United States looked to Japan for support.
The Persian Gulf War presented Japan with a constitutional issue and the alliance with a contingency geographically beyond the defense of Japan envisaged in the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Acting under the existing interpretation of Article 9 of Japan's constitution that narrowly defined the defense of Japan and limited the use of force to the minimum necessary to defend Japan, the Japanese government, in lieu of the deployment of its Self-Defense Force (SDF), contributed $13 billion to support coalition forcesand found itself internationally criticized for "checkbook diplomacy. The report, reflecting in part international criticism of Japan's checkbook diplomacy, pointed Japan toward a more active international engagement, calling on the country to "extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping international order. " 7 To this end, the report advocated that participation in UN peacekeeping activities be recognized as a "major duty of the Self-Defense Force" and that the Self-Defense Law be amended to add peacekeeping to the "primary duties of the SDF. "
The alliance with the United States remained an "indispensable precondition for the defense of Japan"; its nuclear deterrent likewise was "indispensable, " while U.S.-Japan security cooperation represented a "positive 'alliance for peace. '" 8 The report called for enhanced cooperation across a broad spectrum, "including operations, intelligence/command, communications, logistics support, and equipment procurement. " 9 The alliance, however, retained the defense of Japan orientation embodied in Article V of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
As for the SDF, the Higuchi Report found that maintenance of "the minimum necessary 
North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions
As the Cold War was winding down, North Korea's nuclear program presented the United
States and its alliance partners, the Republic of Korea and Japan, with new security challenges.
In 
To the 1997 Guidelines
In the early years of the Bill Clinton administration, the U.S. nature of the alliance to Japan's security. The report also re-introduced into the security dialogue language relating to "situations in areas surrounding Japan" having "an important influence on national peace and security" and called for the "smooth and effective . . . implementation of Japan-U.S. security arrangements" in responding to such situations. The report referred to "continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula" and lack of a "stable security environment" there.
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The reference to "situations in areas surrounding Japan" first appeared in the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in which the two governments committed to studies on "the scope and modalities of assistance to be extended to U.S. Forces by Japan. " The 1993-1994
North Korean nuclear crisis raised the issues relating to assistance to an operational level. 13 cluding studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan. " Finally, the joint declaration outlined areas for cooperation at the regional and global levels.
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The 1997 revision expanded the focus of the alliance from Article V of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which is focused on the defense of Japan, to Article VI, which is focused on the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where the greatest challenges to the post-Cold War order were evolving. The revised defense guidelines emphasized three main areas: defense cooperation under normal circumstances; actions in response to an armed attack against Japan; and cooperation in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, known as "situations in areas surrounding Japan" (SIASJ), the new area of emphasis.
In the event of an armed attack against Japan, Japan had primary responsibility "immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack" and "primarily conduct defensive operations, " while the United States provided supporting offensive operations. Coordination The document worked to establish a security linkage between Article V and Article VI, recognizing that "a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan [and that] the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan. " 16 However, because SIASJ risked raising issues with regard to Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy as well as constitutional and political restrictions on the exercise of collective self-defense, a specific reference to the geographic applicability was omitted.
During debates over legislation to implement the revised guidelines, members of the Diet attempted to define the geographic extent of "situations in areas surrounding Japan"-for example, did the concept extend to the Korean Peninsula, to Taiwan, to the Straits of Malacca? In response, Japanese government officials avoided specific geographic references and defined the concept as "situational, not geographic, " as did the Clinton administration. In 1999, Japan's Diet adopted the Act Concerning Measures for Peace and Safety in Areas Surrounding Japan and moved to put in place the necessary legislative and regulatory authorizations to implement the revised guidelines, while the United States and Japan worked to develop the bilateral coordinating mechanisms and understandings necessary to enable an effective response to a regional crisis.
From the Unipolar Moment
Notwithstanding the so-called U. unlikely, the NDPG found that Japan had to be prepared to deal with "new threats and diverse situations. " The report signaled a structural shift from a static Cold War defense posture to one that is "highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multipurpose" and tasked with being able to respond to ballistic missile attacks and to attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces; defend Japan's "offshore islands"; and address violations of Japan's "airspace and the intrusion of armed special purpose ships and other similar vessels" as well as being able to deal with a "fullscale invasion" and "engage actively in international peace cooperation activities. " Japan's National Security Strategy also called attention to gray zone situations, which it defined as being "neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests, " but having the risk of developing into "grave situations" given Asia's diverse security perspectives and lack of an institutional security structure in the region.
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As for China, the document expressed the expectation that it will "share and comply with international norms and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. " At the same time, it noted China's "rapidly advancing . . . military capabilities" and lack of "sufficient transparency" with regard to its increasing defense budget. Moreover, the National Security Strategy found that:
China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law in the maritime and aerial domains. In particular, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan, including intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.
In sum, the National Security Strategy found China's actions to be matters of "concern to the international community, including Japan, " requiring Japan's "careful attention. " 36 Like Japan's National Security Strategy, the 2014 U.S Quadrennial Defense Review recognized an "uncertain and complicated" globalized security environment in which "the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly central to global commerce, politics, and security. " The QDR noted the increase of military capabilities across the region and existence of "long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to natural resources" that could put at risk regional peace and prosperity. As for China, the QDR called attention to "the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China's military modernization" and the "relative lack of transparency and openness . . . regarding both military capabilities and intentions. " North Korea was cited as "a significant threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia and is a growing direct threat to the United States. " 37 The QDR followed the priorities of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance with its emphasis on the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and defined U.S. interests as "inextricably linked to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. " 38 Accordingly, the document called for the maintenance of a forward-deployed U.S. presence in the region, augmented by rotational forces; the updating of bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand; cooperation with allies and partners "to address growing regional challenges, such as missile defense, cyber security, space resilience, maritime security and disaster relief "; and the pursuit of access to support a continuing U.S. presence.
39
The QDR also noted that the diffusion of technology has enabled the development of asymmetric capabilities aimed at offsetting U.S. military strengths and that, in the years ahead, "China will continue to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches" and employ "other new cyber and space control technologies. " 40 The report cautioned that the development of such capabilities can "restrict access and freedom of maneuver in waters and airspace beyond territorial waters" and challenge "U.S. and partner naval forces and land installations. " 41 The QDR emphasized sustaining "superior power-projection forces" by investing in "combat aircraft, including fighters and long-range strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures and undersea warfare . . . to counter A2/AD challenges. "
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Historically, going back to the opening of Japan and the Open Door policy toward China, the concept of "access" has been at the core of U.S. strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region;
China's growing A2/AD capabilities represent a fundamental strategic challenge to the United States. Being able to "access" the region is critical to the U.S. ability to reassure allies and extend deterrence.
Shaping the Guidelines Review: Four Key Policy Decisions
Four key policy areas will define the framework and shape the substance of the 2014 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Review. They involve policy decisions with respect to the following:
the continuing relevance of the concept of situations in areas surrounding Japan (SIASJ) as a planning and operational construct; extended deterrence/reassurance; gray zone situations; and Japan's decision with regard to the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
The introduction of SIASJ into the 1997 Defense Guidelines expanded the aperture for U.S. Mid-Term Review of Japan's National Defense Plan. 44 During discussions in Tokyo in the summer of 2013, Japanese interlocutors universally recognized that strike capability would not be operationally effective against North Korea's mobile missiles absent access to U.S. command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. They emphasized that consideration of strike capability did not imply a loss of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence and regarded acquisition as a means to strengthen the deterrence posture of the alliance. They also emphasized that Japan would only use strike capability to defend/retaliate, not to pre-empt.
China, they recognized, presented a more complex deterrence case, posing both strategic and regional challenges. In his recent paper, "Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia," Brad Roberts identifies a "stability-instability paradox" that "newly nuclear capable states often become more assertive at the conventional level because of their confidence in being able to deter a strong adversary response with their nuclear means." Japanese strategists are concerned that China's long-range strike capabilities may put at risk U.S.
willingness to support Japan in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict and, at the same time,
Beijing's confidence in its modernized nuclear deterrent posture may "encourage China's creeping expansionism and greater assertiveness in advancing its claims in the maritime environment (and elsewhere). " 45 Similarly, Ground Self-Defense Force Major General Noboru Yamaguchi (Ret.) writes in the working draft of his paper, "The Utility of Nuclear/Conventional Forces in the Second Nuclear Age, " that stability at a nuclear strategic level may not extend to or deter provocations at lower levels and may open the door to confrontations at conventional military and paramilitary levels.
Japanese strategists are concerned with the strategic implications of the United States and China moving toward a posture of strategic stability/mutual vulnerability, fearing that it would free China to resort to coercive tactics in regional disputes.
Gray Zones
To deal in part with gray zone challenges, Japan's 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines introduced the concept of a dynamic defense force and dynamic deterrence. The 2010 document shifted the geographic focus of Japan's policy from Japan's north to its southwest islands and continued the transition, initiated by the Araki Report in 2005, from a Cold War static defense force to one marked by "readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility. " 46 Dynamic deterrence focused on the "operational use of the defense forces. " The dynamic defense force would allow Japan to effectively deter and respond to various contingencies, including full-scale invasion, threats to the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, responses to attacks on off-shore islands, cyber attacks, ballistic missile attacks, complex contingencies, and large-scale chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear disasters, as well as to support efforts to enhance regional and global stability. 47 The operational presence of the Self-Defense Force is aimed at precluding the development of perceptions that a vacuum of Japanese presence exists in gray zone situations, such as the Senkakus. At the same time, the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review also recognized that "the future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace. " 48 Japan's 2014 NDPG noted the increasing trend of gray zone situations. The document also referred to China's "assertive actions" in the maritime domain; attempts "to change the status quo by coercion"; and frequent incursions into Japan's sovereign waters and airspace-"activities that could cause unexpected situations"-and emphasized that "Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty." The guidelines also expanded the dynamic defense force concept into the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, emphasizing the need to strengthen the rapid deployment capabilities of the SDF, in order to achieve effective deterrence and respond to various contingencies. To meet the "increasingly severe security environment," Japan aimed to "build seamless cooperation with the United States ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to 'gray zone' situations." rounding Japan has become "ever more severe, " stemming from "technological progress, an expansion of cross-border threats and changes in the inter-state power balance, " the panel judged that "Japan is now facing a situation where adequate responses can no longer be taken under the interpretation of the Constitution to date in order to maintain the peace and security of Japan and realize peace and stability in the region and in the international community. " 58 Accordingly, with respect to Article 9, the panel, while agreeing that the existing interpretation of paragraph 1 should be understood as "prohibiting the threat or use of force to resolve international disputes to which Japan is a party, " argued that the paragraph should not be understood as "prohibiting the use of force for the purpose of self-defense, nor imposing any constitutional restrictions on activities consistent with international law. " As for paragraph 2, renouncing the maintenance of "war potential, " the panel asserted that it should be understood as "not prohibiting the maintenance of force for other purposes, namely self-defense or socalled international contributions to international efforts. " And as for the existing interpretation that self-defense measures be limited "to the minimum extent necessary, " the panel argued that: Whether to exercise the right of collective self-defense, which because it "is a right and not an obligation," should be a policy decision that the government could refrain from exercising.
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The panel judged that military measures employed in UN-authorized collective security should not be construed as "'the use of force' as a means of settling international disputes . . . and should therefore be interpreted as not being subject to constitutional restrictions." A decision to participate in UN-authorized operations would require Diet approval. The panel also judged Japan's participation as follows: "in UN PKOs, the protection and rescue of Japanese nationals abroad, and international security cooperation, no one of these constitutes the 'use of force' as prohibited under Article 9 and therefore the use of weapons in the course of such activities . . . should be interpreted as not being restricted constitutionally." As for the theory of "ittaika," which it considered in its 2007 report, the panel found that it presented "significant obstacles to actual security operations" and urged that the "the concept itself should be discontinued."
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The report also considered situations related to "imminent unlawful infringement" (gray zone situations, such as submarines loitering in Japanese waters or landings on Japan's remote islands) and questioned whether existing legislation would allow the SDF to exercise the right of individual self-defense to deal with infringements that do not constitute "the organized and 
Defense of Japan/Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
A starting point in the guidelines review process is to consider what the defense of Japan and situations in areas surrounding Japan means in the rapidly evolving 21 st -century security environment. In dealing with threats to the peace and security of Japan, it is important to develop a credible and effective framework for "seamless" cooperation between the United
States and Japan across the spectrum from peacetime to armed attack, to allow for prompt response toward de-escalation as well as escalation. Accordingly, it is important to develop continuous, consistent, and cooperative efforts with regard to joint planning, joint exercising, and joint operations.
Defense of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, should address China's growing A2/ AD challenge that could put at risk the U.S. ability to "access" Japan and extend deterrence.
The Roles, Missions, and Capabilities discussion, including joint training, should focus on this challenge. Development of a "Joint Assured Access Plan," with cyber, space, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance components, would serve both to strengthen the defense of Japan and enhance the deterrence posture of the alliance.
Today, emerging threats from cyber and space domains and advancing A2/AD capabilities suggest that the present understanding of SIASJ-"surrounding areas" and "rear area support"-is both operationally constraining and unrealistic and should be considered to encompass greater depth and breadth. Collectively, the security challenges of the 21 st century speak to the need for a conceptual review of the current understanding and relevance of the concept with regard to both the defense of Japan and emerging security challenges. A main objective of the guidelines review process should be to determine how roles and missions can be apportioned to provide "assured access" for U.S. forces deploying from the Eastern Pacific to defend Japan against aggression.
Extended Deterrence and Antiaccess/Area Denial
Japanese concerns over deterrence challenges posed by North Korea must be considered.
The threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile arsenal will only increase in the years ahead. That prospect has caused debate to resurface in Japan over the need for a Japanese "strike" capability to enhance alliance-based deterrence. Reassuring Japan of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, as well as U.S. capabilities with respect to North Korea, should be a central objective of the guidelines review. Joint planning to deal with North Korean provocations would serve to enhance deterrence and reassure Japan of U.S. commitment.
Likewise, Japanese concerns with the deterrence challenge posed by China at both the strategic and regional levels must be addressed. At the strategic level, the Extended Deterrence
Dialogue is a key element in reassuring Japan of the U.S. commitment to extend deterrence in the face of China's increasing long-range strike capabilities; at the regional level, it is important to reassure Japan of the U.S. commitment and capabilities to operate successfully in an anti-access/area-denial environment.
The present U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue should be integrated into the guidelines review process; at the same time, measures to address the A2/AD challenge posed by China should be considered. In this context, there is need for a more comprehensive discussion of Japan's role in extended deterrence. While it is important for the United States to reassure Japan of its commitment and capabilities to extend deterrence, it is equally important for Japan to participate in joint efforts with the United States aimed at strengthening the overall deterrence picture, in particular with regard to A2/AD challenges.
Gray Zones
Planning for gray zone situations should be integrated into the guidelines review. This is important to strengthening the deterrence posture of the alliance, if for no other reason than that failure to address this issue would be noticed across the region.
In the United States, concerns have been expressed over the issue of possible "entrap- 
Enhancing Alliance Coordination
The 1997 Revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation established a bilateral coordinating mechanism among relevant U.S. and Japanese agencies to be activated only during contingencies. To enhance alliance coordination, the bilateral coordinating mechanism should be made to function under normal circumstances at the level of both countries' national security councils. This would enhance policy coordination across a wide range of issues, including, but not limited to, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping, and anti-piracy operations, at both regional and global levels.
At an operational level, enhanced intelligence-sharing should be advanced. This is critical to the evolution of seamless cooperation across a broad spectrum of situations and contingencies. Realization of such cooperation will serve to enhance the deterrence posture of the alliance. Japan's adoption of the Information Security Act, providing for the protection of classified information within the Japanese government, has opened the door to a closer intelligence relationship within the alliance.
Beyond government-to-government engagement, steps should also be taken to enhance the intellectual content and understanding of the policy debate in both countries. Private sector foundations, think tanks, and universities in both countries can play a significant role in this regard. Student exchanges between the United States and Japan are critical to the formation of the next generation of leaders in both countries.
Creation of a Defense High-Technology Forum
The 1997 guidelines review took place at a time when the Internet was in its infancy. Both governments recognize that the rapid development of technology is driving transformation across the globe. Technology also holds the promise to transform the ways in which defense and deterrence can be operationalized in the years ahead. A Defense High-Technology Forum would focus on just-above-the-horizon disruptive technologies such as directed energy, cyber, nanotechnology, and autonomous systems (unmanned aerial and submersible platforms) that can shape the future of defense and deterrence.
Creation of a Defense Industry Forum
Defense industries in both the United States and Japan face a future of static, if not declining, defense budgets. Both countries have an interest in maintaining critical defense industry infrastructure as well as a skilled defense workforce. Cooperation, rather than competition, for scarce defense resources promises to avoid costly duplication and to strengthen the defense industries in both countries. Cooperation can be advanced by establishing a private sector Defense Industry Forum.
Security-Related Cooperation with Allies and Like-Minded Partners
Japan's decision to use Overseas Development Assistance for strategic purposes as well as the decision to revise the three principles governing arms export to allow for the transfer of defense equipment opens the door to expanded U.S.-Japan cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In Southeast Asia, capacity-building, with respect not only to law enforcement agencies but also to the construction of ports, airfields, and other transportation and communication facilities, can enhance stability and contribute to the maintenance of an open maritime order. Joint planning with regard to specific programs and objectives will enhance efficiency and effectiveness.
The Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-Defense
The 
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That judgment still stands.
On July 1, 2014, the Abe government announced its decision to reinterpret Japan's constitution to allow for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. This decision will significantly shape the substance of the guidelines review and the alliance itself in the years ahead, serving to strengthen both the deterrence posture of the alliance as well as its operational effectiveness by allowing for closer planning and training for a wide range of contingencies that affect the security interests of both Japan and the United States. Critical legislation to implement the government's decision on collective self-defense, including laws governing the Self-Defense Force, will come before the Diet in 2015.
